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1. Introduction
Pension systems principal objective is to provide means for life to people who 
aren’t able to work anymore due to their advanced age. Defi ning the fi nancial and 
labour market situation of older people, pension system becomes an institution 
that determines to a high extent life of this social category.
Th erefore, what should be in the centre of attention of pension economists is 
the fi nancial situation of older people and the way the whole system infl uences 
their life. Polish reformed pensions are indeed being widely discussed, but from 
a very diff erent point of view. In public discourse and in economic expert circles 
much consideration is given to their role for public fi nance and their internal 
fi nancial organization, yet not to how the pension institutions infl uence older 
people in Poland. Similarly, major reason that stood behind the reform was a fi -
nancial, macroeconomic one – to prepare the pension system to be fi nancially 
sustainable in the face of society ageing. Nevertheless, such a  radical systemic 
change should be supported with a complex vision of old age. Having macroeco-
nomic implications of pension system in mind, an individual context should be 
the most important one. However, an analysis of offi  cial documents of 1999 re-
form suggests that there was no such explicit vision (Offi  ce of the Government 
Plenipotentiary for Social Security Reform 1997).
Th is paper discusses possible implications of new pension regulations for 
retirement behaviour in Poland. It presents how new set of institutions may af-
fect several aspects of older people’s life and, consequently, their retirement deci-
sions. In order to obtain more valuable conclusions an interdisciplinary analysis, 
combining methods of economics and sociology, was conducted. Its fi rst part 
describes briefl y the theory of retirement behaviour. Major implications from 
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Becker’s consumer choice theory are presented, yet my approach gets beyond the 
individual rationality and derives from sociological theories of ageing as well. Sec-
ondly, Polish old pension system and its consequences for retirement patterns 
are described. Next section includes projection of reform’s consequences, major 
obstacles that arise in front of positive adaptations and recommendations on how 
to minimize them. Finally, some observations on the ground of theories of ageing 
are discussed.
2. Methodology
Th e analysis will be based on achievements of both economic theory of retire-
ment behaviour and sociological theories of ageing. Following section will present 
a review of the most prominent of these theories and their empirical results. Th ere 
is a number of reasons why an interdisciplinary approach seems to be so fruitful 
and gains popularity in social gerontology (Niezabitowski 2007: 105). Complexity 
of contemporary societies, their dynamics and interrelation of phenomena of dif-
ferent nature imply that relying solely on assumptions of one theory might lead to 
less credible conclusions (Bass 2009). Scott A. Bass writes: “(…) there is a constant 
interaction between the individual and society, each infl uencing each other over 
time, creating multiple perspectives on phenomena and introducing the notion of 
chance” (Bass 2009: 371).
In addition, when positive ageing and quality of life becomes an important 
challenge for societies, the perspective of both science and policy-making should 
connect the areas of pensions, labour markets, health-care, family and others 
(Walker 2003: 2).
2.1. Retirement behaviour on the basis of rational choice theory
Th is section will provide an economic background for analysis of how new pen-
sion regulations might infl uence retirement behaviour in Poland. To begin with, 
based on works of Gary S. Fields and Olivia S. Mitchell (1981, 1982, 1983) a sim-
ple age-of-retirement model will be presented, which proves to be useful to ana-
lyse a  case of the Polish reform. Next, results of empirical research of pension 
economics will be presented.
Economic theory of retirement behaviour emerged from individual labour 
supply models and, consequently, is strongly rooted in the rational choice para-
digm. In particular, the infl uence of Gary Becker (1990) and his recommenda-
tions on how to analyse people’s behaviour were signifi cant. Becker’s most impor-
tant introductions into the theory was that people’s behaviour in many areas of life 
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can be analysed within an economic approach. People in their decisions compare 
profi ts and costs of their options and choose in order to maximise their utility 
(instead of maximisation of income or other decision rules).
2.2. Age-of-retirement model
Individual behaviour is one of a utility-maximiser – people search to maximise 
general utility, which is a function of multiperiod consumption and leisure:
U = U(C, L).
In order to make calculations more convenient, Mitchell and Fields (1982) 
proposed to present a life-time consumption and leisure in the following manner:
U = U(PDVY; RET), 
where PDVY stands for Present Discounted Value of Income and RET represents 
length of retirement period. Th e former refers to the stream of consumption, 
whereas the latter is strictly connected with the stream of leisure. Th e function of 
utility is a classical one, which means that:
U1 > 0; U2 > 0; U11 < 0; U22 < 0.
Th e model introduces further simplifying assumptions. Th ere is neither an op-
tion of partial retirement, nor of a work at retirement. It means that only com-
plete exit from labour market is possible and that it automatically initiates pension 
payments. Individuals are aware of pension regulations and an expected lifetime 
T doesn’t change due to postponed retirement. Individuals take the probability 
of death at diff erent age into account – it is included into the discount rate. Let 
us now concentrate on a  budget constraint. Th e model takes into account two 
streams of income:
PDVY = PDVE + PDVP,
where PDVE and PDVP stand for Present Discounted Value of Earnings and of 
Pensions, respectively – both in net terms. Both of them depend on retirement age 
and PDVP is subject to current pension regulations. Under these assumptions, the 
objective is to maximise utility:
   MAX U = U(PDVY, RET)   (1)
→ →
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subject to the budget constraint:
   PDVY = PDVE + PDVP. (2)
To fi nd the optimal retirement age, let’s make the decision variable R which 
will represent years of work. Both earnings stream and pensions stream vary with 
R. Th e relation between R and RET is:
 RET = T – R.  (3)
Transforming equation (1), the fi rst-order condition of maximum is therefore:
.
Aft er the introduction of (2) and, in turn, (3):
  (4)
Hence, the optimal retirement age is one at which increases of utility due to 
higher lifetime income are equally off set by loss of utility due to shorter period of 
retirement (smaller amount of leisure). At this moment in time, individual has no 
incentives to retire earlier or later, as in both cases general utility will be smaller.
In the next step, changes of income due to changes in retirement age can be 
described. For instance, being at age R, an extra period of work which delays the 
moment of retirement to R’ results in three ways on the income stream:
1. During this period an individual receives an additional stream of earnings 
from work, a discounted value of which equals:
 
2. Pension benefi ts stream is being aff ected by two eff ects:
a. Due to postponed retirement, one will not receive at age R pension benefi ts. 
Th eir discounted value is PDPR.
b. On the other hand, this postponement in most pension systems is being re-
warded by higher future pension benefi ts in periods from R’ to T: ΔPDP(R’;T) 
> 0.
Altogether, the pension benefi ts stream changes by:
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  (5)
It consists of three components, each of which has its economic interpretation: 
               and               represent individual preferences towards income (con-
sumption) and leisure. Mitchell and Fields call them tastes for income and leisure 
(Fields and Mitchell 1982: 6). Expression in brackets, equal to change of present 
value of income, may be interpreted as a price of leisure, as it is, at the same time, 
an amount of income one has to resign from, in order to lengthen the period of 
retirement. Th e fi nal equation can be expressed as follows:
Taste for income * price of leisure – taste for leisure = 0.
Now, it is visible that the choice of optimal retirement age depends on individ-
ual preferences towards consumption and leisure and on the structure of income. 
Th e latter is an eff ect of one’s lifetime expected earnings and pension regulations.
Figure 1 presents determining the optimal retirement age R0 in a  tangency 
point between a utility curve and a budget constraint curve. Th e utility curve is 
convex, whereas the budget constraint curve is concave (a marginal discounted 
income is diminishing in following years of work). Th e exact placement of tan-
gency point may vary. Th ree general cases can be distinguished:
1. R0 = Rmin – when an optimal age is identical with a minimal retirement age, 
an individual will retire exactly when he is entitled to do so.
2. R0 > Rmin – if an optimal age is higher than a minimal one (as in the picture), 
the person should postpone the retirement.
3. R0 < Rmin – in that case, a person will be forced to continue working till the 
minimum retirement age, although it will be disadvantageous in terms of 
utility.
Th e fi nal condition for optimization (5) can be used to analyse the possible 
eff ects of changes introduced to the pension systems. In particular, two changes 
will be considered:
1. changes of pension benefi ts at all ages – higher (lower) by a constant value,
2. changes of pension adjustments due to retirement age – higher (lower) re-
wards for retirement delay.

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Figure 1. Model of optimal retirement age
Source: own preparation, on the basis of Mitchell and Fields (1983: 3).
2.3. Higher pension at all ages
Increasing benefi ts by a constant value at all ages, according to the individual la-
bour supply theory, has two eff ects on the pension system participant. Firstly, the 
retirement becomes more attractive, as it brings relatively more income –PDPR 
increases exogenously, making the price of leisure lower. It invokes a  substitu-
tion eff ect, which leads to an earlier retirement. Secondly, higher benefi ts lead to 
a higher life-time income (PDVY). Th is, in consequence, has an income eff ect – 
being better-off , people tend to buy more normal goods. Leisure is a normal good, 
so it can be expected, that people will buy more leisure, while getting richer. Both 
eff ects have the same direction, so it can be predicted that increasing pension will 
lead to an earlier retirement. An eff ect of an opposite direction should take place, 
when benefi ts are lowered (Mitchell and Fields 1981: 36–37).
2.4. Higher rewards for pension delay
If strength of benefi t adjustments is increased, i.e. following years of a retirement 
delay bring consequently higher rewards (ΔPDP(R’;T) rises), a motivation to work-
ing longer becomes stronger. Conversely, the price of leisure become higher. It 
is called an intertemporal substitution eff ect and it works toward the retirement 
delay.
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3. Empirical research
Th ese theoretical explorations are supported by international evidence. Mitchell 
and Fields’ (1981) analysis of US pension system proves that in case of strong in-
come-pension relation, high base income inclines earlier retirement, while those 
who can gain relatively the most on retirement postponement tend to retire latest. 
Additionally, it was discovered, that sole eligibility of Social Security benefi ts is 
an important factor of retirement. Börsch-Supan’s et al. (2004) and Glans’ (2008) 
research of reformed German and Swedish systems present results corresponding 
to my assumptions. Within a few years from the reform in Germany, actuarial ad-
justments introduced to the pension formula increased the actual retirement age 
by 1,5 year, while in Sweden by almost a year. Swedish experience demonstrates 
that low-income earners postpone the retirement, while high-income earners 
choose early retirement more oft en.
Important lessons can be derived from more recent analysis of actuarial neu-
trality of pension systems. Pension system is actuarially neutral when “pension 
wealth for retiring a year later is the same as pension wealth when retiring today 
plus whatever pension is accrued during the additional year of work” (Queisser 
and Whitehouse 2006: 13). Duval’s (2003) study demonstrates that most of Eu-
ropean pension systems are far from actuarial neutrality and impose very high 
implicit tax on continuing work – pension contributions paid during an addi-
tional year of work signifi cantly exceed benefi t rights accrued during that year. 
It means that pension systems provide disincentives towards retirement delay. It 
is also presented that other incentives, like leisure-preference or the labour mar-
ket situation, have stronger impact than solely fi nancial ones. Defi ned-contri-
bution pension schemes essentially tend to be closer to actuarial neutrality, thus 
they don’t bias individual decisions that strongly. However, contemporary NDC 
schemes (including Polish one), though considered as actuarially neutral, have 
some systematic failures that provoke higher leisure preference among its partici-
pants (Queisser and Whitehouse 2006).
Duval makes also an important notice that, in contrast to rational choice mod-
els, the offi  cial retirement age itself has profound consequences for the retirement 
decisions. He gives a number of reasons for that people tend to retire at the offi  cial 
age rather than make an individual and well-thought-out choice (e.g.: myopia, 
a  social habit, lack of information about pension regulations, practical reasons 
and law limitations) (Duval 2003: 11–12).
Economic models of retirement behaviour demonstrate that individual deci-
sions depend on fi nancial motives, regulatory framework and individual prefer-
ences. Th e last factor can be interpreted in diff erent ways and numerous research 
involved several variables that can determine decisions, e.g. wealth, work satisfac-
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tion, household perspective, family size, health or labour market situation (Mitch-
ell and Fields 1981). Ex ante, the fi nal outcome of changes in pension systems is 
oft en ambiguous.
3.1. Lessons from sociological theories of aging
Th e boundary conditions of economic age-of-retirement models, which are regu-
lations and preferences, are to a high extent infl uenced by a cultural and insti-
tutional context. Individual behaviour is strongly infl uenced by how her or his 
society understands ageing and what behaviour patterns exist in this society. Th e 
following section will present some conclusions from sociological theories of age-
ing, which may be useful to analyse retirement patterns in Poland. Both tradi-
tional and contemporary theories of ageing will be considered.
3.2. Meanings of age
Reaching retirement age is for many people a  key point in their life-course. It 
distinguishes two stages of life – the stage of working career and the stage of re-
tirement. Th is strong distinction is oft en identifi ed with the distinction between 
the middle age and the old age. However, it doesn’t have to be so – it would be 
improper to call a-forty-eight-year-old miner “old”, who has just retired. On the 
other hand, there are cases of people that postpone their retirement even beyond 
the age of 70, which is unquestionably defi ned as “old”. Aforementioned examples 
point on the dissonance between diff erent meanings of age. Th erefore, the lit-
erature distinguishes, among others: chronological age, biological age, functional 
age, social age and age of economic behaviour (Urbaniak 1999: 19–27).
An important implication that runs from expansion of meanings of age is that 
they are not necessarily synchronised with each other. Particularly, biological and 
functional age, which are of physical origin, can be diff erent from the social and 
the economic age at individual level. Th e social age refers to a life-course, charac-
teristic for a society, with its sequence of social roles and involvement in conse-
quent interaction nets. One of its dimensions is the economic one, which leads to 
the age of economic behaviour. Society’s and economy’s needs force individuals to 
enter and exit the labour market at specifi c ages, which are usually defi ned by law. 
At the same time the economic old age is being defi ned – a period in which people 
don’t work anymore and their fi nancial needs are maintained by their families or 
by state (Urbaniak 1999: 343–349). As economic activity and profession became 
the most important role and a  basis for people’s identity and social status, the 
role of age of economic behaviour increased (Niezabitowski 2007: 81). Th e social 
age, and in eff ect the social perception of old age, became tightly connected with 
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the age of economic behaviour. It is, therefore, of great signifi cance, how pension 
regulations set the retirement age.
3.3. Traditional theories of ageing
Historically, two major theories that tried to describe ageing on individual level 
and took opposite views were the disengagement theory and the activity theory 
(Hooyman and Kiyak 2008; Urbaniak 1999). Representatives of the disengage-
ment theory considered withdrawal of older people from the labour market and 
from social activity in general as natural and resulting from biological and psy-
chosocial needs of older people. In place of previous social roles – active and very 
engaging, older people look for passive ones, which allows them to function at 
a lower activity level and rest. What’s important, is that supporters of this theory 
argue, that this process is benefi cial and gratifying for older people and functional 
for the whole social system (Niezabitowski 2007: 94).
Th e activity theory presents quite an opposite view. It argues that the more 
activity during the last phase of life, the more satisfaction and the higher life qual-
ity in general. Since, while ageing, people still perceive themselves in categories of 
middle-aged, it is important for them to fulfi l social roles that are related to mid-
dle age or to fi nd new ones instead.
Which view corresponds to the reality? In every society there are examples 
of both types of ageing – there are people that become passive relatively fast and 
there are ones that remain active, in diff erent aspects of life, till their very last 
years of life. Th e question is, which type of ageing is really more benefi cial for 
individual.
Th e results of empirical research were disadvantageous for the disengagement 
theory. It was shown, and now is being treated as certain, that passivity at old age 
leads to health problems: mental and physical. Th ere is a relevant relation between 
social activity and character of individual ageing, which consists in a  fact that 
activity increases quality of life at old age (Niezabitowski 2007: 89). Authors of 
UNDP “National Human Development Report: Poland 1999” among a number of 
psychosocial risk factors that may infl uence negatively the quality of life of older 
people enlist: a sudden lifestyle change (including abrupt retirement), loneliness, 
excessive free time and boredom (Golinowska 1999: 21). Th ey are direct conse-
quences of social disengagement, which contradicts with argumentation of the 
disengagement theory. Oft en, an exit from the labour market causes ‘a retirement 
shock’, a serious blow for mental condition of new pensioners, who fi nd it hard to 
adapt to a new, passive lifestyle (Golinowska [ed.] 1999: 48).
Probably the strongest limitation of both traditional theories was that they 
adopted a  universal view of ageing, independent of contextual and individual 
characteristics (Achenbaum 2009: 31–32, Gans et al. 2009). Th e disengagement 
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theory was based only on biological assumptions and rejected cultural factors 
(Niezabitowski 2007: 99). Th e activity theory didn’t take into account health and 
fi nancial diff erences between individuals, which are important determinants of 
remaining active (Achenbaum 2009: 32).
3.4. The infl uence on practice of social policy
Both activity theory and disengagement theory have been very infl uential on pub-
lic policies. Th e disengagement theory sanctioned a  social practice of an early 
retirement and of a mandatory retirement, as functional both for older people 
and for the whole society (Niezabitowski 2007: 114–115). In eff ect, between 1950s 
and early 90s pension systems in Western Europe became more and more gener-
ous, while offi  cial retirement age gradually declined (OECD 2011: 33). It were 
so-called “pull factors”, which altogether with “push factors” (e.g. employers atti-
tude towards older workers) and “jump factors” (searching of lifestyle change), led 
to lower labour activity of older people. It is argued that in developed countries 
a whole “early retirement culture” emerged, a set of social patterns that sanctions 
early exit from labour market (Hinrichs and Aleksandrowicz 2005: 4–7).
Conversely, the activity theory laid emphasis on prolonging activity of older 
people, either by continuing work or by providing new forms of activity. Especial-
ly, since 90s the idea of active ageing has found growing popularity among policy 
makers and took form of many programmes and innovations in not only tradi-
tional areas of health-care, labour market and pensions, but also in strengthening 
the third sector and the civil society (Walker 2003). A set of actions prepared on 
the supranational level (e.g. European Council Stockholm 2001 and Barcelona 
2002) took as its priorities fl exibility of labour markets and pension systems. It is 
argued that only institutions that leave maximum choice to older workers them-
selves can be successful in increasing older people activity. However, achieving 
this goal will require a change at a cultural level – in employers’ and employees’ 
beliefs and habits (Niezabitowski 2007: 93; Walker 2003: 29–31). One of the major 
step in that process were pension reforms in most EU countries, which have taken 
place since 1997. One of their common goals was to strengthen the link between 
individual contributions and benefi ts and to increase offi  cial retirement age.
3.5. Contemporary challenges and modern theories of ageing
Another limitation of traditional theories is that they were constructed in the re-
ality of industrial society and their categories are of limited use when we try to 
analyse the contemporary society. Post-industrial economy, globalisation and de-
mographic trends bring new challenges to theories of ageing. Among them, a few 
most important can be named:
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• an increasing share of older people in societies;
• an increasing longevity – old age shouldn’t be treated as a uniform period, 
but rather as a set of several phases (Golinowska 1999: 7);
• transformation of employment – instead of traditional, stable careers, em-
ployees face risk of being made redundant and of growing competition 
(Walker 2009);
• a decay of welfare state – in 80s and 90s many developed countries have 
undertaken serious changes in their social policy. In general, the level of 
welfare provision has diminished and the accent has been put on individual 
responsibility (Walker 2009). Polish Transition had a similar, neoliberal di-
rection.
In general, these changes bring to citizens both new risks and chances, a com-
plex of phenomena called by Ulrich Beck (1992) ‘the society of risk’. Older people 
seem especially exposed to risks of modernity, due to changes of welfare states 
and reduced social safety nets. On the other hand, people enjoy greater predict-
ability of living longer and in good health, which brings security and allows indi-
viduals to make long-standing plans. Settersten and Trauten (2009: 458–459) call 
these new conditions ‘the period of big “Ifs”’, one of high contingency, when many 
positive scenarios arise, yet their fulfi lment depends on many conditions. In these 
circumstances new sociological theories of ageing emerged, which are, among 
others, the perspectives of: social constructionism, political economy of ageing 
and feminist theories (Hooyman and Kiyak 2008: 320–322). Now, their results 
will be presented briefl y.
Social constructionism breaks with the tendency to search for one uniform 
theory of ageing and treats old-age as a  social construct, a  concept produced 
within a certain group, dependent on local economic, cultural and societal con-
text (Hooyman and Kiyak 2008: 329). Consequently, to understand old-age, we 
have to get the knowledge about several local conditions, e.g. values and rules 
dominant in local culture, public discourse, social and economic hierarchy. Also 
personal characteristics should be considered, i.e. how important social variables 
– gender, class, race – determine ageing on individual level.
Walker (2003, 2009) presented how social construct of old age and its relation 
with welfare state developed in time, in developed countries in general. Aft er the 
World War II, when welfare states were being formed, older people were given 
rights to welfare provision. Th ey were treated as ‘deserving poor,’ but in a posi-
tive way. However, it also meant institutionalization of old age and the economic 
dimension became the basis of social construction of older people. In industrial 
economies social position of older people diminished, because they played little 
part in the production process. It led to a crisis of social identity of older people 
– a phenomena, called by Ernest W. Burgess ‘a roleless role’, when old age is as-
sociated mainly with poverty and illnesses (Niezabitowski 2007: 79). Economic 
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changes were supported by cultural ones, as since 60s a development of a cult of 
youth have been observed. Old age became defi ned from a perspective of youth, 
thus its social status obviously inferred signifi cantly (Golinowska 1999: 47–49).
Th e spread of neoliberal ideology, with its emphasis on cutting public expendi-
ture and on individual responsibility, brought a change in attitudes towards older 
people. Pension and health-care systems became perceived in terms of their costs. 
Consequently, older people became a burden for societies and general perception 
of them changed from a positive into a negative one. Walker (2009) points out 
that it was a case mainly of Anglo-Saxon countries, while European Union welfare 
systems tried do adjust to new risks and gave more attention to social inclusion 
and protection of older people.
Political economy of ageing studies how the position of older people in society 
and their entitlements to public benefi ts and services change due to political proc-
esses. It also examines inequalities within the category of old-aged itself and the 
role of political and institutional actors in mentioned processes (Walker 2009).
Th is approach proves to be particularly fruitful when analysing changes that 
have taken place in recent decades. What we observed, was a gradual withdrawal 
of governments from their previous responsibilities in many areas of social life. 
Under the pressure of current fi scal limitations and of alarming demographic 
predictions many European governments undertook pension reforms. In late 
90s and in 2000s similar changes took place in a number of Central and East-
ern Europe countries (Walker 2009). As a result, benefi t levels diminished and 
became more dependent on life-time earnings. Instead of a wide scope of in-
come redistribution, the rule of individual responsibility was given greater im-
portance. According to Scott A. Bass, Western societies: “(…) demonstrated de-
clining fi nancial commitment to the public good through social welfare while 
displacing this responsibility and risk to individuals and their families” (Bass 
2009: 356–357).
In eff ect of these changes, inequalities among older people have increased. 
Individualization leads to a diff erent risk exposure for diff erent social categories. 
Unfortunately, the most disadvantaged seem to be those already at the bottom 
of social hierarchy. Settersten and Trauten (2009) refer to the theory of cumula-
tive inequalities and argue that social class is the factor that determines one’s 
chances of high-quality old age. Th e better-off  will enjoy a variety of choices for 
their old age, while ageing of the poor will be a period of high uncertainty and 
insecurity. In future, social class will become an even stronger reason for social 
divisions.
Authors representing political economy perspective suggest that described 
situation was created not due to bottom-up processes and desires of societies, 
but rather because of pressure of specifi c actors in global economy and politics. 
Bass (2009) and Walker (2009) name international corporations and international 
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governmental organizations (IGOs) – the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and 
the WTO as those responsible. Th ey argue, that ideological motives represented 
by these institutions (and not the ones of social welfare) led to limitation of so-
cial protection of older people and to strengthening the principle of equivalence 
(Walker 2009: 605).
A somehow similar perspective is being presented by feminists of ageing. Th ey 
underline the inequalities among older men and women. Old women, though 
form a considerable majority of their age category, are being treated in an inferior 
way by public policies. When old, women oft en suff er the consequences of previ-
ous discrimination – due to a lower life-time income and childbearing, their pen-
sion wealth is lower. In addition, many women have to take care of their grand-
children or their parents or have to face the loneliness of widowhood (Hooyman 
and Kiyak 2008: 323–325).
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Old pension system in Poland
Within this theoretical framework an analysis of pension reform in Poland will be 
conducted. As its starting point, the old pension system and its most important 
features for retirement decisions will be described. Secondly, characteristics of re-
tirement behaviour under that system and of the culture of retirement in general 
will be presented.
Th e old pension system, formed during the late socialism era and in the early 
90s, was a repartition system with a defi ned-benefi t method of calculating benefi t 
levels. Since the pension reform covered only those born in 1949 or later, its regu-
lations are still in force.1 Th ree of its elements that are particularly relevant for the 
retirement decisions are: pension formula, offi  cial retirement age and legislation 
of working at retirement.
Th e old defi ned-benefi t formula is constructed in a way that there is little rela-
tion between total contributions paid into the system during working career and 
pension benefi t levels. It consists of two parts: a so-called “social element”, equal 
for every pensioner, and of an individual, earnings-related element. Th e former 
1  Precisely, the old system covers to some extent also younger generations. Women born in 
1949–1954 who are to retire in 2009–2014, will receive mixed pensions, which will consist of two 
elements, calculated according to old and new rules. People that started working before 1999 also 
are subject to old rules, since they pension wealth contains also ‘initial capital’. Th erefore, the new 
system will reach its full maturity only about 2040, when fi rst generations of workers that started 
working aft er 1998 will retire.
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equals 24% of an average wage in the economy, whereas the latter was calculated 
on the basis of earnings from a specifi c number of years.2
In practice, the old pension formula has two major consequences for the fi nan-
cial situation of Polish pensioners. Firstly, it provides high benefi ts, compared to 
the contribution rate. Before the reform, the system was very generous - average 
benefi ts corresponded to 70% of average wage in the economy, which was a high 
level, even when compared to developed European countries. In recent years it fell 
slightly below 60% (ZUS 2010).
Secondly, the structure of benefi ts is relatively fl at and income inequalities 
among older people are smaller than those among working population. Accord-
ing to the OECD, in mid-2000s Gini coeffi  cient for the retirement age population 
in Poland was 0.28, while for the working age population – 0.38. To indicate both 
the generosity of the system and the inequalities we can use the replacement rate. 
It is an index measuring the relation between fi rst benefi t aft er retiring and the last 
wage. If it is equal for all income levels, the system is equivalent and preserves in-
equalities. In old pension system replacement rates depend strongly on the income 
level. It guarantees very high replacement rates (even exceeding 100% in extreme 
cases) to low-income earners, while high-income earners receive lower benefi ts, 
in relation to income from work (about 40% for the richest) (presented in Fig. 3).
To present it briefl y, the old pension system resembled much an old-age wel-
fare provision system. It means that old-age poverty relief and social inclusion 
were major objectives of the system. According to EU-SILC 2008 research, pov-
erty rates for the population of older people in Poland are much lower than ones 
for whole society and for older people in Western Europe.
Offi  cial retirement age was set at 60 for women and 65 for men, however a con-
siderable share of workers were entitled to an early retirement privilege. Th ey 
could retire at 55 or 60 respectively, without pension reduction. Further privileges 
were given to some occupational groups, like miners and railway workers, which 
entitled them to higher benefi ts and an even earlier age of retirement.
Finally, the obstacles to continue working aft er early retirement are limited. 
Pension is subject to reduction once the earnings exceed 70% of average wage and 
is suspended when earnings reach 130% of average wage.
4.2. Consequences for retirement patterns
Presented features of old pension system resulted in certain behaviour patterns of 
its participants – Polish workers adjusted their retirement decisions to the insti-
tutional surrounding. In general, basing on the rational choice theory, rules in all 
2  One could choose a more benefi cial from two alternatives: either consecutive 10 years out of 
last 20 of working career or any 20 years out of whole working career.
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mentioned areas worked together to encourage early retirement. Firstly, the privi-
lege of early retirement enabled individuals with strong free-time preference to 
retire at the age of 60 for men and 55 for women, and for some groups even earlier.
Secondly, in the consequence of high replacement rates, the loss of individual 
income aft er retirement was so small that it made income from work relatively 
unattractive. It was an ordinary substitution eff ect, when utility of leisure com-
bined with high pension income exceeded utility of on-the-job income. In turn, 
high pension wealth had an income eff ect, which caused higher leisure preference.
Th irdly, little relation between the actual retirement age and received benefi ts 
discouraged from postponing retirement. Early retirement usually didn’t mean 
lower benefi ts, while premium for working longer than legal retirement age was 
too small to actually encourage people to do it. Pension formula rewarded every 
extra-year of work by estimated 1.5–2.5% increase of future benefi ts.3 It means 
that the intertemporal substitution eff ect was very weak. On the contrary, old 
pension system put very high implicit tax on workers that decided to continue 
working – total increase of gross pension wealth was much smaller than contribu-
tions paid during this extra period.
In consequence of these three eff ects retiring before having reached the offi  cial 
age became a common practice, which has prevailed till the recent years. Th ose 
who actually work till the offi  cial retirement age form a small share of whole pop-
ulation: in 2009 they accounted for 19.5% for men and 37.5% for women. Average 
actual retirement age is way below the offi  cial one of 60/65 and in 2009 equalled 
61.0 for men and 57.8 for women (ZUS 2010).
Another common pattern was to retire early, but at the same time remain ac-
tive in the labour market. A very attractive option of receiving double income was 
chosen by some 14.3% in 2007. However, still for many occupational groups (e.g. 
miners, policemen) retirement below the age of 60/65 is not treated as “early” and, 
therefore, over 17% of all pensioners aged less than 60/65 still work (GUS 2007).
A more insightful analysis of multiple reports on Polish pensioners provides 
several specifi c patterns of retirement behaviour, which exist in Polish society:
1. Th e main reason for retirement is the eligibility to pension benefi ts itself. 
Financial and other reasons are less important (GUS 2007: 49). Conversely, ac-
cording to the same report (2007: 174), major reason for delaying the moment 
of retirement is income from employment (46%), however non-fi nancial needs 
are important too (29%). Accruing rights to higher pension in future is a minor 
reason (12%). Another research (Krzyżanowska 2008) presents more detailed, but 
3  Based on calculations for: diverse income levels ranging from 0.7 to 2.0 x national average; 
3 non-contributory years and prolonging the working career year-by-year from 30 to 40 contribu-
tory years. Chłoń-Domińczak (2009: 15) assesses that increase at “less than 5.0% a year”, however it 
seems unreasonably high.
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still corresponding results – main reason for retiring is bad health (52%), and 
far behind: bad employer’s situation (5%), risk of losing the job (4%), chance of 
increasing income by combining pension with additional work (4%) and need to 
take care of a sick relatives (3%). Factors in favour of postponing the retirement 
are: avoiding the income drop (50%), loss of prestige (8%) and satisfaction from 
work (5%).
2. Retirement behaviour is very diversifi ed and a few clusters of workers can 
be distinguished, with respect to personal income and education level. Th ere is 
a number of strategies of retirement behaviour, which include choice of actual 
retirement age and decision about labour activity.
2a. Actual retirement age
Figures 2a and 2b present retirement age for diff erent income groups in 2006. For 
both women and men, there is a general tendency that the share of early retire-
ments increases with income, whereas the share of late retirement diminishes with 
income. Th e share of late retirements (at the age of 60/65 or later) is outstandingly 
high among low-income earners. In 2006 among the poorest men (below 50% of 
average wage) it reached 73.4%, compared to 26.7% for all income groups. For 
women, these shares were 82.0% and 15.2% respectively. Th e data demonstrates 
that there is also a  signifi cant growth of retirement age for the highest-income 
earners – over 200% of average wage (Chłoń-Domińczak 2009: 12).
a) women       b) men
Figure 2. Actual retirement age by groups of income in 2006 – for women and men
Source: own calculations on the basis of data in Chłoń-Domińczak (2009: 12).
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2b. Labour market participation
Due to common early retirement, labour activity of older people is very low. 
In 2006 in the pre-retirement age category (55–60/65) only 27.3% were active, 
whereas 5.3% of those aged 60/65+ still worked (GUS 2007: 23). Among those, 
who remain active there is a signifi cant overrepresentation of people with higher 
education and of those with primary education (GUS 2007: 28–33).
Th ere is also an interesting case of people that didn’t retire, though could have. 
Th ose who didn’t retire and still work earn 40% more than those who retired and 
still work (Bobrowicz 2008: 46). It is either because of a very high income, which 
exceeds 130% of average pension (and makes receiving pension impossible) or 
probably due to some non-fi nancial reasons, like a loss of prestige or a stigma of 
pensioner that discourage from retiring.
Th is data points on an important conclusion: there are two major groups of 
workers that postpone the retirement and participate in the labour market longer 
– people with very low income and people with very high income. In the case of 
the lowest-income earners, the reason that stands behind it is probably a very low 
total income of the household. Th ese people are either not eligible for pension 
benefi ts or their pension income is too low to make a living (even though their 
replacement rates may be very high). In the terms of rational choice theory, their 
taste for income is very high in comparison to the taste for leisure.
Conversely, high-income earners’ behaviour can be explained in two ways. 
Firstly, due to low replacement rates they suff er a strong income drop aft er the 
retirement, so work continuation is a way to avoid it. Secondly, they may prefer to 
continue working for non-fi nancial reasons, like prestige, social interactions and 
satisfaction from work in general.
4.3. Planning retirement
Researches about planning retirement present general passivity of middle aged 
people in this area – many people don’t make any previous arrangements at all and 
just follow social and legal patterns of retirement (Krzyżanowska 2008: 17–18; 
GUS 2007: 70–78). Many people, mainly those with high and low education, in-
dicate that they are going to work as long as it’s possible. It is also presented that 
those people who plan working usually accomplish it, but there is also a consider-
ably large group of pensioners (about 1/4) that are forced to work, despite previ-
ous plans of deactivation.
On that basis, altogether with whole welfare regime, a specifi c culture of early 
retirement came into existence. Several research present that in Polish society 
there is a common view of retirement as of a time to rest, which should begin the 
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earlier the better4 and during which one can relax aft er years of ‘hard work.’ At the 
same time, pension benefi ts are treated as a deserved privilege and it is the state’s 
obligation to provide them (Golinowska 1999: 41–42). Th is view infl uences the 
behaviour at earlier stages of life – expecting early retirement, people don’t invest 
in their qualifi cations (e.g. low participation in life-long learning and trainings) 
(Matysiak 2004; Kononowicz, Michałowska and Majewska 2009).
At individual level the process of retirement takes place abruptly, with people 
withdrawing quickly from their worker’s role. Usually, employers don’t organize 
any transition period, during which older workers could get accustomed to life 
past retirement. Old pension regulations strengthen this eff ect – only 10 years, 
chosen from last 20 years of work are considered in benefi t calculation. Th erefore, 
for many workers fi nal period of their career is the most engaging one. Eventually, 
withdrawal from work means an even greater shock for them, in many cases lead-
ing to mental and physical problems (Golinowska 1999).
What’s more, it usually meant also a withdrawal from other social roles one 
played in their previous life. Research presents that life of Polish pensioners is 
a solitary one, with little contacts with other people. Th eir major activities include 
watching television, meeting with friends or neighbours and taking rest in general 
(Wądołowska 2010). Work is not being associated with ageing – as factors of suc-
cessful ageing Polish respondents indicate health, family and friends. Work was 
chosen by the least number of respondents, however with relevant diff erences due 
to education level (Maniecka-Bryła and Bryła 2008).
What’s positive about the situation of older people in Poland is the social at-
titudes towards them. Positive vision of elderly in Poland is very strong and it is 
even getting stronger in time. Older people, at least in survey’s declarations, are 
treated as a very valuable resource rather than as a burden for society (Kotowska 
2004; Wądołowska 2009).
4.4. Barriers for labour activity of older people
It has to be noted that, what majority perceive as a privilege, for many others is 
an obstacle. Many workers (especially well-skilled ones, but not only) prefer to 
continue working aft er reaching the retirement age. Work is for them a source 
of many non-fi nancial benefi ts of diff erent types: emotional, interpersonal etc. 
However, there is a pressure to retire, which is developed from younger workers, 
from employers and from social norms in general. In that case pension system 
indirectly leads to old-age discrimination on the labour market.
4  In 2003 preferred retirement age was indicated at 53 by women and at 58 by men (Wóycicka 
and Matysiak 2004: 63).
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Th e culture of retirement infl uences strongly the demand side of the labour 
market. Polish employers still value older workers ambiguously – though for some 
their life-experience, loyalty and other qualities are an advantage, a  dominant 
view is quite opposite. People over 50 fi nd it hard to get employed and are the fi rst 
to dismiss (Kononowicz et al. 2009). Experts argue that in Polish companies there 
is little awareness of the process of ageing (both individual and societal) and, in 
eff ect, no systemic approach to the needs of older employees. Th e conception of 
age-management remains of little use in Poland (Boni 2004; Matysiak 2004).
Paradoxically, this disadvantageous situation of older people is reinforced by 
certain regulations of Polish labour law that were meant to protect older. For in-
stance, jubilee rewards and protection against dismissal during the pre-retirement 
period is for many employers an argument against hiring older people or keeping 
them employed. It makes especially hard for unemployed in their pre-retirement 
age to fi nd a new job. Pre-retirement benefi ts, in turn, are used as a  reason to 
dismiss older employees fi rst and to protect the younger ones (Perek-Białas and 
Małodzińska 2005; Kononowicz et al. 2009).
4.5. Reformed pension system
Th e reform introduced a partially funded system, which, in its mandatory part, 
consists of two separate institutions, so-called pension pillars. First pillar re-
mained a  PAYG one, and is still administered by ZUS. Since 1999, part of the 
contribution (7.30 p.p. out of the total contribution of 19,52% of wage) has been 
transferred from ZUS to private pension funds (OFE), which invest them in fi -
nancial markets. Th e pension formula has been fundamentally changed into a de-
fi ned-contribution one. It means that benefi ts are an outcome of only two factors: 
sum of contributions accumulated during working career on individual accounts 
in both pillars and life expectancy at the age of retirement. It ensures an actuarial 
fairness of the pension system and puts an end to income redistribution (with 
some exemptions).
Another important feature, at least in the original plans, was discontinuation 
of early retirement privileges. Some of them still remained in force, but their scope 
is much limited now. In 2009 the early retirement option was eliminated and, to 
a certain number of workers that had already vested the right to it, an option of 
a ‘bridging pension’ was given. Eventually, the number of benefi ciaries eligible to 
early retirement fell from ca. 1.1 mil. to 270,000 bridging-pensions benefi ciaries. 
In addition, regulations of 2001 liquidated pre-retirement allowances and made 
pre-retirement benefi ts less available.
In comparison to the old, ‘welfare-provision-like’ system, the new one is much 
alike a life-cycle income allocation scheme. It means that benefi t levels are con-
nected directly with total amount of contributions paid into the system and de-
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pend on individual decisions whether to retire or not. Th e only instrument of 
social protection that remained in the pension system is the minimum pension 
guarantee, granted to pensioners that have a working career of at least 25 years. 
However, now it’s being indexed at a  lower rate and, hence, its implications for 
poverty reduction will be smaller.5
Under new regulations, levels and structure of benefi ts will change. Replace-
ment rates will be equal for all income categories, but for the richest one, yet with 
contribution-benefi t equivalence retained.6 It means that some income categories 
will lose on the reform, while other may gain. Figure 3 presents estimated replace-
ment rates in relation to income level (RR-I) in old and new pension system.7 
What is probably the most visible is the new fl at slope of the RR-I lines. Secondly, 
what stands out is the RR-I line for women – in the new system it is well below the 
old one, at all income levels. Th e same observation applies to men that earn below 
1.7–1.8 of average. It means that all women and majority of men will lose on the 
reform, in terms of pension benefi ts. Th e only income category that will probably 
take advantage of these changes are the highest-earning men – those whose life-
time earnings exceed 1.7–1.8 of national average. However, they account for only 
ca. 11%–15% of all pensioners (Chłoń-Domińczak 2009; ZUS 2010).
Such situation means that poverty prevention and social inclusion will no 
longer be achieved to such a high extent. Many older people will fall into poverty, 
while income inequalities will increase to the levels similar to those in the rest 
of society. Estimations from 1999 show that up to 17% of pensioners will receive 
benefi ts low enough to be eligible for a minimum pension guarantee. Now, we can 
say with a high certainty that this number will be much higher. Siwek (2004) con-
ducted an analysis of poverty-relief eff ectiveness of new pension system. She ana-
lysed how many years individuals at diff erent income levels will have to work in 
order to receive benefi ts higher than the minimum pension.8 Women of average 
income will have to work at least 28 years to achieve that pension level, whereas 
ones with income of 85% of average wage will have to work at least 38 years and 
5  Minimum pension was set in 1999 at 415.00 PLN, equal to 40% of average wage at that time. 
Since then, it has been indexed at a regular rate (Consumer Price Index +20% of real wage growth) 
and in 2010 it was equal to 706.29 PLN, about 22% of average wage.
6  Th e upper limit of wage subject to pension contribution is 250% of the average wage. Th ere-
fore, for people that earn more than that level, the replacement rates will diminish.
7  Th ey are calculated for a constant-income career profi le, consisting of 30/35 years of contribu-
tory periods (for women and men respectively) and 5 years of non-contributory periods. A review 
of several projections of replacement rates is provided by Kłos (2008). Szumlicz’s projections (2009), 
used in my calculations, are situated approximately in the middle.
8  Minimum pension may be used as an approximated poverty line, though it’s systematically 
below the social minimum line. In 2009 the minimum pension was 675.10 PLN, while social mini-
mum for a pensioner was 905.00 PLN (IPiSS).
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retire at the age of 62.9 Higher offi  cial retirement age for men, combined with 
a work record of 32–39 years, saves them from poverty, unless they earn less than 
45% of average wage.
4.6. Retirement behaviour in the new pension system – economic outlook
Th e new set of institutions will require people to undertake some actions in order 
to maintain their living standards and avoid poverty. In face of lack of personal 
savings, many of them will have to work longer. Abolition of early retirement op-
tion will automatically increase average actual retirement age, while further hy-
pothetical labour market adaptations may be subject to discussion on the basis 
of rational choice theory. We have to distinguish two types of eff ects that may 
take place when the new regulations come into force: ones caused by changes in 
benefi t levels and ones caused by adjustments of benefi ts due to diff erent actual 
retirement ages.
Th eory suggests that lower pension benefi ts at all ages for the majority of peo-
ple will have an income eff ect (due to lower life-time wealth) and a substitution 
eff ect (pension smaller in relation to wage) that will have the same direction and 
will encourage them to work longer. Analogically, highest earning men, whose 
pensions will probably increase, will now have stronger incentives to retire earlier.
Th e fact that for each additional year of work one’s pension will increase by at 
least 10% (Chłoń-Domińczak 2009) will encourage all workers to postpone re-
9  For comparison, in 2009 only about 10% of new pensioners had work record shorter than 
30 years (ZUS 2010).
Figure 3. Replacement rates in old (OS) and new (NS) pension system
Source: Szumlicz 2009 and own calculations.
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tirement – it will cause an intertemporal substitution eff ect. Th e only category of 
workers that this eff ect may omit are lowest-earners – ones covered by the mini-
mum pension guarantee. Th eir benefi ts are subsided by government, so an extra 
year of work for them may not lead to an actual higher pension. Th ey may fi nd 
it more economical to retire at the minimal possible age and, potentially, enjoy 
income from both employment and pension sources.
Just to remind, the optimal retirement age is being determined by the equa-
tion:
Table 1 presents how each element of the equation will change under the new 
pension rules, for two major income groups.
Table 1. Changes of optimal retirement age determinants after the pension reform
Factor Low-income earners High-income earners
Higher – income eff ect due to lower 
general PDVY.
Lower – income eff ect due to higher 
general PDVY.
PDER Constant (no changes to earnings). Constant (no changes to earnings).
Higher – higher benefi t adjustments for 
each extra year of work (intertemporal 
substitution).
Higher – higher benefi t adjustments for 
each extra year of work (intertemporal 
substitution).
PDPR
Lower – lower pension benefi ts (ordinary 
substitution).






Lower – income eff ect. Higher – income eff ect.
Source: own preparation on the basis of Fields and Mitchell (1982: 7).
Introducing these observations back into the equation, we may fi nd out the fi -
nal eff ect. Let’s assign: ⇑ – when a factor’s force increases; ⇓ – when a factor’s force 
decreases; const – when factor’s infl uence doesn’t change. Th en we have:
a. For low-income earners: {⇑} ∗ [{const} – {⇓} + {⇑}] – {⇓}  →{⇑}
Low-income earners will probably experience stronger incentives towards 
postponement, because all three eff ects work in the same direction.
b. For high-income earners: {⇓} ∗ [{const} – {⇑} + {⇑}] – {⇑} → ?
In this case, fi nal eff ect is ambiguous, because higher incentives to postpone 
retirement work in an opposite direction to higher benefi ts that can be received 
at all ages. Individual decision will depend on which eff ect is stronger – the inter-
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-temporal substitution eff ect or the income eff ect with the ordinary substitution 
eff ect combined.
Additionally, projected changes are presented on fi gure 4a and 4b. Th e budget 
constraint curve (PDVY) will change. For low-income earners it will be situated 
lower, but with a steeper slope. In eff ect, the tangency point of the curves of budg-
et constraint line and utility will move to the left , with a  lower total utility. For 
high income earners both slope and intercept of the budget constraint curve will 
increase. Th e exact tangency point will depend on how the utility curve U2 will be 
situated.
a) low-income earners     b) high-income earners
Figure 4. Retirement behaviour adaptations after the pension reform
Source: own preparation.
If we summarize these considerations, three groups of benefi ciaries might be 
distinguished. For low-income earners, who will constitute the majority, both ef-
fects work in the same direction, which means that they will have strong incen-
tives to postpone their retirement in order to receive higher benefi ts. Retirement 
decisions of highest-earners (about 15% of total) are ambiguous as two eff ects 
have opposite directions and the fi nal one will depend on individual preferences. 
Additionally, for ones that receive minimum pension, subsided from budget, fi nal 
eff ect is ambiguous. Some of them will retire at legal retirement age, while other 
will continue working. Inferring from the behaviour of current pensioners, most 
of them will remain active in order to improve their living conditions. Hence, 
adaptations we might observe will probably be similar to those in Sweden and 
Germany.
For the purpose of clarity, the analysis above did not take into account the 
possibility of working at retirement. It makes options of individual choice broad-
er, though it doesn’t change the sense of the eff ects described above. Supposedly, 
many low-income earners will chose to work at retirement, as it increases contem-
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porary income. Th ere is one obstacle that may make work at retirement harder 
to accomplish. A recent regulation says that in order to retire, one has to resign 
from his current job at fi rst and only then may he get employed again. Th e whole 
process may be discouraging for retirees and prevent them from remaining active.
4.7. The infl uence of social and institutional surrounding
Pension reform might contribute signifi cantly to higher labour activity among 
older people. New regulations correspond to ones advised by experts as meas-
ures to improve old-age participation (Hinrichs and Aleksandrowicz 2005). Th ey 
bring the system closer to actuarial neutrality, which is supposed to make smaller 
distortions to labour market, leaving decisions subject to individual preferences. 
However, in order to achieve higher activity further conditions have to be fulfi lled.
First and foremost, described in previous section culture of retirement means 
that the whole process will take much time. Beliefs about retirement, shared by 
older people, their employers and their younger colleagues will be hard to change 
– examples of rich developed countries prove it (Hinrichs and Aleksandrowicz 
2005). Crucial for overcoming this cultural barrier seems to be awareness of new 
pension regulations. From the young age people should be well informed about 
them so that they could plan their education, career, savings etc. adequately. How-
ever, although it is already 12 years aft er the reform, awareness remain very low 
(Roguska 2010). Pension system is a  typical black box, a  complex mechanism, 
with a mysterious interior, unapproachable for a non-expert. Góra (2008) argues 
that it’s not a serious obstacle, since people will “learn by doing” – they will auto-
matically adapt, when facing the decisions. Th is view seems to omit serious dis-
tortions that may take place in the meantime.
Undergoing changes lose acceptability and legitimacy due to low quality of 
legislation process and its products. Pension regulations undergo frequent chang-
es, which are oft en unreasonable and contradictory to each other. It causes high 
uncertainty and intensifi es the ‘black box’ perception. No wonder that people fi nd 
early retirement a safe option and that there is a strong opposition against raising 
offi  cial retirement age for women (Roguska 2011). An option worth considering 
is an introduction of gradual retirement. Giving more choice, it might contribute 
to the legitimacy and acceptability of higher actual retirement age (Hinrichs and 
Aleksandrowicz 2005; Wóycicka and Matysiak 2004).
Similar doubts arise with reference to labour demand adaptations. Without 
adjustments in Polish companies strategies, increasing actual retirement age and 
labour activity of older people might not succeed. It might be especially hard for 
physical workers, who face a natural barrier at some point of life. Th e opportuni-
ties lie with improving health, technological change and development of a serv-
ices economy – all these factors work in favour of unskilled workers (Kesneci 
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2007). In the long-term, the increasing share of older workers and diminishing 
number of potential young employees will probably make employers adapt auto-
matically. However, it should be facilitated by active labour market policies, pro-
moting fl exible employment, trainings, and work-force mobility10 (Kesneci 2007).
4.8. Interpretation according to theories of ageing
Instead of a summary, a brief discussion on the basis of theories of ageing will be 
conducted. With high probability, the pension reform will increase labour activity 
of older people. Consequently, the model of ageing in Poland might evolve from 
a disengagement ageing to an active ageing, which, in turn, can possibly have pos-
itive long-term eff ects for Polish elderly, in terms of their health, interactions, so-
cial and political position and life satisfaction in general. Longer activity, imposed 
by new fi nancial surroundings can change the paradigm of ageing in Poland.
Nonetheless, this is a highly conditional state of the world – many obstacles 
named in previous section can make this process long and problematic. What’s 
more, ageing in Poland will become much more riskier and individualised. In-
dividual fi nancial situation will depend strongly on one’s lifetime eff orts, but not 
only. For instance, capital pensions are subject to fi nancial markets’ situation, 
hence, the pension level may vary signifi cantly, depending on the exact moment 
of retirement. Similarly, labour market situation will be highly uncertain.
On the grounds of political economy, growing inequalities will be observed, 
which will, to some extent, counteract the positive aspects of active ageing. New 
pension system improves the situation of the well-off  and deteriorates one of the 
worse-off , which corresponds with the hypothesis of cumulative inequalities. Th e 
worse-off  are being disadvantaged twofold. Not only will they have lower chances 
to enjoy long and peaceful retirement, but they also may fi nd it harder to work 
longer – due to more physical character of their work (Hinrichs and Aleksandro-
wicz 2005). Class may become an important dimension of divisions among older 
people and so is the gender, as the ‘privilege’ of earlier retirement for women may 
become a discrimination factor now.
Aforementioned improvement of labour market fl exibility and of companies’ 
policies can make this process go more smoothly. At least as important as that, 
seems to be the public discourse and the social construction of ageing. Aft er all, 
the direction and strength of adaptations will depend on beliefs of every indi-
vidual. Th erefore, it is of a great relevance to provide proper education and infor-
10  Some of these policies have been recently implemented: governmental program “Solidarity 
of generations” is going to increase labour activity of people aged 55–64 to 50% until 2020 and will 
cost ca. 17B. PLN. Since 2004 older people have been treated as a special risk group on the labour 
market.
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mation about the pension system and to promote a vision of active ageing. Th e 
discourse should change its main attention from issues of the system to one’s of 
its participants.
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Abstract
Pension reform in Poland totally changes fi nancial and legal incentives that shape retire-
ment behaviour. Among others, the early retirement option was abolished and a contri-
bution-benefi t equivalence was introduced. Th e paper presents an analysis of fi nancial 
eff ects of these changes for pensioners and potential adaptations of retirement behaviour 
on the basis of the rational choice theory. Next, referring to sociological theories of ageing, 
the cultural and institutional infl uence was considered. It is projected that the category 
of pensioners will become much more diversifi ed fi nancially and most of older people 
will decide to postpone the retirement. Potentially, it may lead to a new pattern of ageing 
in Poland, an active one with positive implications for older people. However, multiple 
factors, among others: “the culture of early retirement” and labour demand limitations, 
might counteract this process.
